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Two-factor theories of avoidance were conceived to explain responding in avoidance procedures that closely resemble the Pavlovian paradigm in superficial features, although differing in the fundamental contingency of reinforcement. Both typically involve an arbitrary conditioned stimulus and a trial-by-trial sequence of pairings between the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. According to two-factor theory, the instrumental reinforcement of avoidance is based on the Pavlovian reinforcement of a drive state in the presence of the conditioned stimulus. It has been shown, however, that the presence of the conditioned stimulus is not necessary for the occurrence of avoidance responding. A procedure in which the sole effect of the avoidance response was a reduction in the average frequency of occurrence of an aversive electric shock proved to be fully adequate to maintain lever pressing in rats, thereby suggesting that not all avoidance requires two factors.
Further experiments with various new procedures suggested that the conditioned stimulus may function as a discriminative stimulus for the avoidance response, rather than as a stimulus whose removal is inherently reinforcing, as two-factor theory requires.
The conditioned reflex was to I. P. Pavlov (1928, pp. 59-60 ) the final answer to the problem of biological adaptation. As a mechanist, Pavlov sought a naturalistic explanation for everything an animal did, which had come to mean an explanation in terms of physical processes that could be isolated by the vivisectionist techniques of nineteenth-century physiology. But the behavior of many animals, for example, the dog, precluded any such simple machinery. Dogs clearly differed in what they did and seemed to know even though they might share virtually identical inheritances. The psyche of 1 Preparation of this paper, as well as the conduct of the previously unpublished experiments described herein, was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation to Harvard University. The author wishes to express thanks to P. N. Hineline for his generosity in allowing use of some of his as yet unpublished data and for help in formulating some of the notions here advanced. An early and much reduced version of this paper was presented at the 1966 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D. C., as part of a symposium on Aversive Control. The author owes thanks to J. V. Brady for having organized the symposium and for inviting him to participate in it. To another of the participants, D. Anger, special thanks are owed for his vigorous and insightful criticisms of many of the author's theoretical ideas.
the dog was, in other words, a sizable obstacle to the progress of a science of adaptation even in Pavlov's day, two and a half centuries after Descartes had initiated modern reflexology in 1664.
The process of conditioning seemed to explain adaptation and also to retain the scientism of Pavlov's lifelong approach to problems. Acid, for example, was a natural stimulus for salivation in the mouth of a dog. Presumably, the excitation of the sensory surface of the mouth was transmitted through the nervous system to the salivary glands. Aside from the multiplicity of the connections within the nervous system, there needed to be no difference between this system and the classical reflexes of tendons and joints. The adaptiveness of the salivary reflexes was readily squared with the dominant biological theory of the time, for Darwin's theory of natural selection implies that adaptive, inherited reflexes would be favored in the struggle for survival. Pavlov's contribution was to show that the elicitation of a response such as salivation was transferred to arbitrary and initially neutral stimuli by temporal pairing. If a dog repeatedly heard a buzzer before getting a dose of acid in its mouth, it would soon begin salivating at the sound of the 49 buzzer. What had taken nature aeons by its old method of natural selection was here accomplished in minutes by its new method -conditioning. The vast advantages conferred on conditionable organisms was more than enough explanation of how this process itself might have arisen on the phylogenetic scene. A conditionable organism is adapted to a changing environment, reshuffling responses almost momentarily so as to keep abreast of the haphazard changes of its circumstances.
Pavlov's notion of conditioning was reminiscent of the classical doctrine of association. From the time of Aristotle, philosophers had been struck by the psychological power of sheer contiguity. The experiencing together of two ideas seems to forge a bond between them so that subsequently one calls forth the other. Though it was distinctive in important ways, Pavlov's theory of conditioning was but one more in a long list of associationisms, stipulating as it did that the transfer of power from one stimulus to the other was based simply on their approximate simultaneity. Pavlov often made clear that he saw his work as an improvement over classical associationism, primarily because of its thorough objectivity.
Unfortunately for the subsequent development of objective psychology, Pavlov's version of associationism left out more than the superfluous subjectivity, for he never brought his experimental skills to bear on the question of the necessary and sufficient conditions for his discovery. Pavlov showed that the pairing of a neutral stimulus with a natural elicitor of salivation, like acid or dry food, creates a new reflex-the production of salivation by the now no-longer-neutral conditioned stimulus. But he did not question what there was about the pairing that was important. Was it, as he said, that the contiguity itself created new pathways within the cerebral hemispheres because regions of simultaneous excitation inevitably become connected? Or was it, as Zener (1937) said, that contiguity sets the occasion when an anticipatory response would be most effective? Zener was arguing that the conditioned salivary response is not identical with the response naturally elicited by the dry food or the acid. The conditioned response is, rather, a readying of the animal for the arrival of the unconditioned stimulus. In the case of dry food or acid, salivation is appropriate both as preparatory response and as terminal response, but not every response in the situation is thus doubly appropriate. The dog does not, for example, ordinarily start chewing until the food itself is in its mouth, even though by strict Pavlovian principles it might start chewing as soon as it starts salivating.
The problem of the consequences of the conditioned response apparently did not concern Pavlov, perhaps because he was engrossed with a response system whose natural consequences are virtually undetachable from its activation. How effective would Pavlov's procedure be if the salivary response does not moisten the food, dilute the acid, or irrigate the mouth? For the salivary response, the consequences are almost inextricably interwoven into the physical properties of the situation. In contrast, Pavlov's countryman, contemporary, and codiscoverer of a new and objective method for the study of adaptation, V. M. Bekhterev (1913) , was using a procedure that did not have this peculiar inflexibility.
At about the same time as Pavlov, Bekhterev had also developed a method for producing adaptive changes in behavior. Bekhterev used what has since been called motor, instead of salivary, conditioning. A dog would be exposed to a sequence consisting of some originally neutral stimulus, followed by a painful electric shock to a forepaw. The reflex response to the shock was leg flexion and the adaptive change was the occurrence of leg flexion as soon as the neutral stimulus was presented. Superficially, the difference between Pavlov's and Bekhterev's discoveries was minor, concerning only the physical response-muscular instead of glandular. The similarity in their findings-the shifting of a response from one stimulus to another -tended to make the two situations look still more similar. Nevertheless, it is impossible to tell whether the two procedures are basically similar or profoundly different until something more is said about Bekhte-rev's experiment. In particular, was the flexion response an effective escape response, which is to say, did it terminate the shock as soon as it occurred; was it, moreover, an effective avoidance response, which is to say, did it cause the shock to be omitted on any trial in which it occurred before the shock was turned on but after the neutral stimulus was presented ? In order for Bekhterev's procedure to be comparable to Pavlov's the flexion response would have to have been an effective escape response, terminating an ongoing shock, but never an effective avoidance response, for in Pavlov's procedure, the dog's behavior in no way controlled what stimuli the experimenter presented.
Judging from the accounts published in English (Razran, 1956) , the experiments in Bekhterev's laboratory sometimes used one procedure and sometimes another, largely fortuitously. In many later experiments done in the United States using adaptations of Bekhterev's procedure, (e.g., Hull, 1934) , the conditioned response did preclude the electric shock. Because of this feature of the procedure, the term "avoidance training" (Hilgard & Marquis, 1940, p. 58 ) came into use, for it is obvious that without this feature, the term would be unsuitable. Although it is obvious, it was nevertheless widely unrecognized. Many of the experiments in which there was a genuine avoidance contingency were discussed in strictly Pavlovian terms, as if the necessary and sufficient part of the procedure was the simple contiguity, or association, of conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. An example is Hull's (1929) treatment of the "conditioned defense reaction" as a type of contiguity conditioning even though his discussion reveals it to be an avoidance response.
THE EMERGENCE OF TWO-FACTOR THEORY
Given this setting, the somewhat strange developments in the field of avoidance conditioning starting in the mid-1930's make a kind of sense. The ambiguity in the basic procedure favored a corresponding fuzziness in the theory of avoidance behavior, with the notion of contiguity crucial, albeit unexplicated. Recognition of the ambiguity gave rise to a series of procedural changes that displaced various elements of Pavlov's method until the simple contiguity theory was no longer applicable. The present paper will recount only a fraction of this interplay between method and theory; there have been several outstanding reviews of the literature recently (Mowrer, 1960; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Solomon & Brush, 1956) .
One of the first investigators to see the conceptual problem and to do an experiment to clarify (if not solve) it was Schlosberg (1934) . He compared two procedures for the motor conditioning of the tail-flick response in rats. In one procedure the response precluded the delivery of the electric shock; in the other, it did not. Schlosberg confessed his surprise when he found that the response was conditioned to about the same extent-which, incidentally, was not very well-with the two procedures. Schlosberg, who was at this time formulating two different paradigms for learningone based on contiguity and the other based on the consequences of the response-was looking for a difference between the two procedures.
In spite of his inability to find a difference between the two major alternatives for motor conditioning, Schlosberg deserves credit for the conceptual distinction. After Schlosberg's paper, it was only a matter of time before someone succeeded in teasing apart the effects of sheer contiguity from those of letting the response influence the sequence of stimuli. The most often cited experiment along this line seems to be the one by Brogden, Lipman, and Culler (1938) . It was not, however, the first one after Schlosberg's to show that an instrumental response is more easily conditioned than a noninstrumental one (e.g., Hunter, 1935) .
The apparatus used by Brogden, Lipman, and Culler was a running wheel, the standard device for studies of general activity in the laboratory rat. These investigators, however, used guinea pigs and compared the two procedures for motor conditioning labeled A and B in Figure 1 . The guinea pigs were in the wheel and could run at any time. Every once in a while, at intervals not precisely specified in the publication, a STIMULUS RESPONSE FIG. 1. Diagrams of the two procedures examined by Brogden, Lipman, and Culler (1938) . (A. The instrumental conditioning procedure, in which running in the wheel terminated the conditioned stimulus and avoided the shock. B. The classical conditioning procedure, in which the stimulus and shock were presented on every trial, independent of the response. The shock line shows both the shocks delivered-above the line-and the shocks that would have been delivered but for the occurrence of avoidance responses-below the line.) tone was turned on for 2 seconds, at the end of which a brief, painful shock of prespecified duration was delivered. Most guinea pigs are goaded into running by such a shock, which is what the "response" in Figure 1 refers to. For the guinea pigs in Group A, a running response great enough to rotate the wheel about 1 inch was an effective avoidance response if it preceded the shock. Once the shock came on, nothing could be done to alter it. A dashed line below the shock line without a curved arrow above it indicates a shock scheduled but not presented. (Throughout these procedural figures, it will be possible to compare the shocks that would have been given if the animal had not made the designated response with the shocks that it failed to avoid.) For Group B, then, the occurrence of the running response had no effect on the presentation of shock. The two groups correspond, in other words, to the two versions of Bekhterev's experiment, or, to put it eponymously, correspond to the Pavlovian paradigm and the Thorndikian. The findings were clear-cut. The Thorndikian group, A, learned to respond precurrently and eventually reached virtually 100% performance. The Pavlovian group, on the other hand, while it started out about as well as the Thorndikian, soon fell behind by not improving as rapidly, and later even snowed signs of falling back from levels of performance once attained.
The conclusion drawn by Brogden, Lipman, and Culler was that Pavlov's characterization of the conditioning process was wrong because it left out the consequences of the conditioned response, something that was, as noted before, inevitably built into the salivary response, but independently manipulable in the case of motor conditioning. In technical parlance, the experiment was taken as evidence for the law of effect, which was Thorndike's principle, and against the conditioned reflex, which was Pavlov's.
With the publication of this influential paper by Brogden, Lipman, and Culler, the study of avoidance had crystallized as a study in its own right and was no longer merely one of the various conditioned-reflex procedures. From here on, the work of O. H. Mowrer becomes central in the developing theory of avoidance. In a paper published in 1939, when he was at Yale, Mowrer gave a lucid anticipation of the position that he was to defend, in various altered and elaborated versions, until the present. Mowrer presented no new data; he was, rather, putting what was already known about avoidance into a new setting. He spoke about anxiety, rather than avoidance, but he was clearly using the term in a limited sense.
Mowrer's main point in this paper was that Freud, not Pavlov, was right about anxiety. Freud (1936) had concluded that anxiety came from anticipations of danger, and that much of neurosis was concerned with the elimination of anxiety-provoking stimuli. Mowrer saw in Freud a kindred soul, theoretically speaking, for the Yale psychologists around Hull had come to believe that learning in general-hence the learning of a neurosis-could be accounted for by some form of the law of effect. Unlike the Pavlovians, the Hullians would insist that the avoidance response exert some effect, and since in an avoidance procedure the avoidance response is by design not followed by any change in the unconditioned stimulus, the response's effect must be on the animal itself. To quote Mowrer (1939) :
The position here taken is that human beings (and also other living organ [ism] s to varying degrees) can be motivated either by organic pressures (needs) that are currently present and felt or by the mere anticipation of such pressures and that those habits tend to be acquired and perpetuated (reinforced) which effect a reduction in either of these two types of motivation. This view rests upon and is but an extended application of the well-founded law of effect and involves no assumptions that are not empirically verifiable [p. 561] .
The prevailing view in America had reversed itself in the 10 years between Hull's paper and Mowrer's. Hull's original account was strictly Pavlovian, and now his junior colleague was arguing that Pavlov was wrong and that the crucial paradigm was Thorndike's, although he preferred to relate his view to Freud's as regards anxiety. The switch in viewpoint could have been an appropriate reaction to the procedural refinements of the Brogden, Lipman, and Culler experiment or to others like it. It had, indeed, been shown that the strict contiguity required by Pavlov's theory produced less effective motor conditioning than did the instrumental paradigm. The view was, however, to keep changing as further refinements evolved, each carrying the method of avoidance a bit further away from the apparent purity of strict contiguity.
Mowrer himself was one of the leading innovators in this methodological and conceptual evolution. In 1942, he and Lamoreaux (Mowrer & Lamoreaux, 1942) published a monograph on avoidance conditioning. The apparatus was the productive shuttle box, adapted by Mowrer and Miller at Yale specifically for the study of avoidance learning, although it had been used before for just this purpose (Gentry, 1934) . The shuttle box is a small rectangular chamber with a metal-grid floor across which electric shock can be presented, a couple of light bulbs or a buzzer, and the means for observing the rat without being observed by it. The Mowrer-Lamoreaux monograph of 1942 examined various temporal configurations in the pairing of the conditioned stimulus with the electric shock. The avoidance response was throughout merely the running of a rat from one side of the chamber to the other. Figure 2 shows as Part A the basic procedure used in this study. Aside from the lack of a precise specification of the duration of the intertrial interval, but which was about 2 minutes on the average, this is Lamoreaux (1942, 1946) . (A. The standard avoidance procedure, in which the response may either terminate the conditioned stimulus and avoid the shock, or, if it occurs after the shock has been turned on, terminate both the stimulus and the shock. B. The shock-avoidance and shock-escape contingencies are divided between two different responses. The avoidance response shuts off the conditioned stimulus and avoids the shock. The escape response shuts off the shock. C. Avoidance with a fixed-duration, inescapable shock.) now often referred to as "classical" avoidance, showing that too much of our naming of procedures is done without the proper concern for clarity. "Classical" avoidance, then, is not "classical" conditioning-which is just contiguity conditioning-but is the Mowrer procedure of the early 1940s. It is similar to the instrumental condition of the Brogden, Lipman, and Culler study, but adds the extra instrumental feature of an escape contingency. Once on, the shock is terminated by the rat's running to the other side. Part A shows an escape response, that is, running with a latency greater than 5 seconds after the onset of the conditioned stimulus; an avoidance response, that is, running with a latency less than 5 seconds and thereby causing the shock of that trial to be omitted, and a trial containing no response, when the shock will stay on presumably until the experimenter is satisfied that nothing useful is going to happen.
The procedural innovation was reflected in Mowrer's (Mowrer & Lamoreaux, 1942) explanation of avoidance, which was now shifting from the monistic position taken in the earlier paper (Mowrer, 1939) tQwa.rd.8 the dualistic theory long associated with him. He said that the running response is first learned in the situation as a result of the escape contingency in the presence of the shock itself. This learning is of the Thorndikian variety, with the response clearly instrumental in terminating the shock. Next, owing to a presumably Pavlovian mechanism, the response tends to move earlier in time so that it occurs in the presence of the conditioned stimulus, making it an avoidance response. The avoidance response is maintained, said Mowrer, by the escape from the conditioned stimulus itself, which, he further said, becomes anxiety-provoking and is thus reinforcing in its removal. Avoidance conditioning, by this procedure which includes both an escape and an avoidance contingency, is cast in terms of a pair of escape contingencies, one from the shock itself, and the other from the conditioned stimulus, which has become fearsome and therefore motivating. How the stimulus becomes fearsome, Mowrer did not yet try to explain.
The next major procedural change in this development (Mowrer & Lamoreaux, 1946) tested the notion of a pair of escape contingencies. Once again there were three experimental groups, each involving a different arrangement of the avoidance contingency, as shown in Figure 2 . Section A is, as already noted, the standard avoidance procedure, consisting of a dual contingency for the running response: At first it is an avoidance response, but after the shock is turned on, it becomes an escape response. Section B is an experimental separation of the two contingencies, which was Mowrer's ingenious method for testing whether there was any necessary connection between the two roles played by the single response in the standard procedure. For 5 seconds before the onset of the shock, running avoids the impending shock and turns off the conditioned stimulus, just as in the standard procedure. Once the shock is on, however, running no longer affects the shock, even though it still turns off the conditioned stimulus. Now, in order to turn off the shock, which would otherwise stay on indefinitely, the rat must jump into the air. The shockescape response here differs from the shockavoidance response. In the study, there were, of course, balanced groups to cancel out the factor of response-form per se. Section C is a further demonstration that the shock-escape contingency is not the determiner of the avoidance response. Once on, the shock lasts 2 seconds no matter what the rat does. An avoidance response during the 2 seconds turns off only the conditioned stimulus. This last procedure in effect duplicated that originally used by Brogden, Lipman, and Culler (1938) .
The significant finding of the experiment was that having different avoidance and escape responses did not prevent avoidance. Given this, it was no longer possible to argue for any important Pavlovian mechanism involving the response itself; it had been shown that the simple associative process of stimulus substitution, which here would have been nonadaptive, was unable to account for the adaptive performances obtained. While it was true that of the three groups, the anti-Pavlovian one (Group B) learned most slowly and least completely, in the theoretical context of the time, this was far less significant than that the group learned at all.
The suggestion of the experiment was clear: There was some kind of intrinsic reinforcement for the avoidance response in the presence of the conditioned stimulus. A solution was near at hand, but Mowrer was not ready to seize it. He said, as he had in the preceding papers, that the rat was afraid while the conditioned stimulus was on, but he was essentially silent on the sources of the stimulus' power.
Mowrer did not long maintain this uncomfortable theoretical position. In 1947, just 1 year later, he abandoned the single-factor approach and formulated the first two-factor theory explicitly designed to account for avoidance behavior. It was not the first general theory of learning involving two factors, however, as Mowrer carefully pointed out. Schlosberg (1937) had argued, 10 years before, that learning can occur either by Pavlovian conditioning or by the mechanism of the Thorndikian law of effect. And Skinner (1935) , with his distinction between operant and respondent conditioning, had also been more than a decade ahead of Mowrer in allowing both Pavlov and Thorndike fractional credit for a theory of learning. The list of anticipators could easily be extended, and perhaps should include Thorndike himself, who had long since (1913) incorporated something like Pavlov's theory into his own under the notion of "associative shifting." But for all of his predecessors, Mowrer was first to describe the union of the two kinds of conditioning discernible in conventional avoidance procedures. He pointed out that the pairing of the conditioned stimulus with the shock is the operational equivalent of Pavlovian conditioning; consequently, if fear is conditionable, it would come to be elicited by the originally neutral stimulus, just as salivation was elicited in Pavlov's experiments. To say that fear is conditionable, which is to say that fear is itself a covert response, seemed to solve the problem of the instrumental avoidance response in all of the procedures examined so far by Mowrer and others. In each procedure, two well-known and presumably well-established paradigms for learning unite to provide the animal with a drive state that is appropriately reduced by the instrumental response. The standard avoidance procedure, with its escape and avoidance components, could now be depicted as a pair of escape contingencies, as, for example, from an electric shock and a loud noise, except that one of the things to be escaped from is a stimulus with only acquired aversiveness.
Mowrer's two-factor theory of avoidance was not accepted without dispute. For some years, theorists debated whether the law of effect explained the conditioning of the fear itself, in addition to the avoidance response, so that only one kind of learning was required. To the majority of psychologists, however, it was just a matter of time and, of course, a matter of research (e.g., Mowrer & L. N. Solomon, 1954) before some version of Mowrer's dualistic account prevailed. Notwithstanding the nuances, it seems fair to group with Mowrer's the theories later espoused by Schoenfeld (1950) , Sidman (1953b) , Dinsmoor (1954) , Wynne (1954), and Anger (1963) . In all of these theories, an underlying state, said to be produced by Pavlovian conditioning, is altered by the occurrence of the avoidance response, which is thereby instrumentally reinforced. The major difference among them is in the characterization of the underlying state. For Mowrer and R. L. Solomon, "fear" or "anxiety" transfer from the shock to the conditioned stimulus, terms that seemed too laden with excess meaning for Schoenfeld and his former students at Columbia, Dinsmoor and Sidman, as well as for Anger. These more strictly descriptive psychologists preferred to speak of the transferring of "aversion" denned solely by the fact that the removal of the conditioned stimulus appears to maintain the avoidance response.
The evolution away from the Pavlovian paradigm had shown that avoidance is not simply a matter of Pavlovian conditioning as far as the response itself is concerned. Pavlovian conditioning had retreated to that part of the procedure that was still Pavlovian in design-the pairing of "conditioned" and "unconditioned" stimuli-leaving the response to the control of the instrumental contingency. The next evolutionary step, to diminish further these Pavlovian vestiges, was Sidman's novel procedure (1953a), shown schematically in Figure 3 . First, it used a continuous session, rather than one broken into trials. Second, it contained no explicit stimulus to signal an impending shock. Instead, the shock was delivered every so often-10 seconds in the diagramas long as the animal failed to respond. Third, it presented a brief, inescapable shock of fixed duration, instead of a shock that had to be terminated by an escape response. The avoidance response-the depression of a lever-simply postponed the next shock for some further period of time-again 10 seconds in the example shown in the figure. Sidman's (19S3a) avoidance procedure, with shock-shock and response-shock intervals both equal to 10 seconds.
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Whenever the animal stopped responding, it would be shocked 10 seconds later and at the appropriate intervals thereafter. The temporal features of the situation were fully specified by two durations: The interval between successive shocks if there were no intervening responses, and the interval between a response and the next shock, again if there were no intervening responses, the "shock-shock interval" and the "responseshock interval," respectively. Sidman found (1953b) that the ease of conditioning and the terminal rate of responding depend upon the conjunction of values of the two parameters.
In the procedures for which two-factor theory was first developed, conditioned stimuli were unquestionably present, owing to the confounding of instrumental and Pavlovian paradigms, if for no other reason. Sidman's procedure was the first in which the trappings of the Pavlovian method-the trial-by-trial structure marked off by conditioned stimuli-were clearly meant to be absent. But then, in the very first account of his results, Sidman showed how the key Pavlovian ingredients could be located, albeit only by inference since they were not explicitly programmed. He pointed out that anything the rat does, aside from pressing the lever, is paired with the shock. Hence, by Pavlovian conditioning, all of this other, unrecorded behavior will take on the aversive properties of the shock itself. As a result, the Thorndikian paradigm will maintain any activity that terminates or precludes the punished behavior and its associated aversive stimuli. And the only activity that suffices is the avoidance response-lever pressingitself. Two factors, it would seem, are present here just as they are in Mowrer's procedure. The originally neutral external stimulus of Mowrer's procedure is replaced by the inferred stimuli emanating from nonavoidance behavior. The reinforcement of the instrumental avoidance response is, just as in Mowrer's account, the removal of stimuli that have become aversive through pairings with shock.
One of the hazards of postulating unprogrammed events is that other theorists may postulate also and do so differently. Anger (1963) has argued that, in addition to the stimuli associated with nonavoidance behavior in Sidman's procedure, the passage of time itself, as measured from the discriminable events in the situation-responses and shocks-generates stimuli. Because of the temporal regularities of Sidman's procedure, Anger further said, these time-stimuli are differentially correlated with shocks and so must differ in their aversiveness. Finally, he said, avoidance responses change the time stimuli to less aversive values and are thereby reinforced in the standard manner for avoidance behavior, which is to say by the removal of conditioned aversive stimuli. Thus, although Sidman and Anger differ in the details of theory, both have relied on two factors, of which one requires the postulation of inferred stimuli.
Virtually all of the modern theories of avoidance involve two factors, one based on the Pavlovian conditioning of a motivational state known by various names (fear, anxiety, conditioned aversion, etc.) and the other based on an instrumental response serving to rid the animal of the motivational state. The current state of knowledge is an advance over what Mowrer encountered towards the end of the 1930s when he first began to express uneasiness with a monolithic Pavlovian framework, as well as over the monolithic instrumental account that he started with. Two-factor theory seems to make good sense out of the original avoidance procedures, with their intermingling of Pavlovian and Thorndikian components. The question now is whether the contemporary extensions of two-factor theory necessitated by new procedures have imperceptibly pushed it over the line into irrefutability. Needless to say, in order to be a useful theory, it must be disprovable. The remainder of this paper presents an argument against two-factor theory on the grounds of its irrefutability and also attempts to formulate an acceptable alternative.
ARE Two FACTORS NECESSARY ?
According to theory, the explicit conditioned stimulus plays a critical role in the maintenance of behavior in avoidance procedures, Mowrer (I960) states the role clearly in a description of a demonstration avoidance experiment:
there is a tendency to say that the subject has learned to avoid the shock-hence the term, "avoidance" learning. But this is a rather inexact, abbreviated way of speaking. More precisely, what the rat has learned is (a) to be afraid in and of the white compartment and (b) to reduce the fear (and shock, when it is presented) by running into the black compartment. Strictly speaking, it is not the avoidance of shock that is rewarding to the animal and keeps the running response going. It is rather the fact that the white compartment arouses fear and the running provides a solution to, or escape from, this "problem" or drive. The avoidance of the shock is a sort of by-productthough, to be sure, a very important one. Action which thus appears to be ideological or "purposeful"-and which, in a sense, indeed is-can in this way be accounted for in a purely causal, or consequential way [p. 30]. Schoenfeld (1950) similarly viewed the conditioned stimulus as crucial:
The avoidance response, by this formulation, is not really avoidance at all, or at least is only incidentally so. Its function is not to avoid, and it is not made "in order to avoid." Rather, it is primarily an escape response, reinforced by the termination of secondary noxious stimuli, including proprioceptive and tactile ones, and possibly also reinforced by the production of proprioceptive secondary positive reinforcers [p. 88].
Figures 1-3 reveal, however, that effective avoidance procedures include a common feature, so obvious as to be taken for granted, but possibly the sole necessary condition for avoidance. In each case, the frequency of shock is reduced by the occurrence of the avoidance response, which is to say, an avoidance response avoids the shock. Truistic as that may seem, it is neither obvious nor trivial whether avoidance would occur when it achieved nothing but shockfrequency reduction. The success of such a procedure would challenge the motivational role of the conditioned stimulus in standard procedures, for having shown that the removal of the conditioned stimulus is not necessary for avoidance, we may wonder if it is sufficient.
In recent years, the standard account has been questioned by a few investigators. Sidman (1962) and Bolles, Stokes, and Younger (1966) , for example, have argued that the avoidance of the noxious event is not a mere by-product of the underlying processes, but rather a factor in its own right. Their evidence, however, presents the various opportunities for the postulation of anxiety reduction that earlier extensions of two-factor theory have outlined, either because of the fixed temporal relations (Sidman) or the use of an exteroceptive conditioned stimulus (Bolles et al., 1966) . To examine the necessity of two factors, what is needed is the minimum avoidance procedure-one containing no conditioned stimulus, either explicit or plausibly postulated. Either such a procedure is possible or the notion of a conditioned stimulus has retreated out of range of empirical scrutiny. Although conceptually simple, one candidate for such a procedure proves to be unhappily complex in its realization, as shown in Figure 4 (Herrnstein & Hineline, 1966) . The heart of the program consisted of a multichannel punched tape that advanced every 2 seconds during the course of an experimental session, irrespective of anything else. At every step of the tape, the apparatus made a decision whether or not to shock the rat, depending on the holes punched into the tape in one or the other of the two operative channels. One channel governed shocks if more recent event was a response; the other channel governed if it was a shock. The postshock channel typically had the higher frequency of holes, which is to say, the higher probability of shock. The rat could shift control from the high-probability channel by depressing the lever. The postresponse channel retained control until the next shock, which could occur at any moment after the response (including, with some frequency, virtually instantaneously) or at any 2-second point thereafter. Responses in the interim had no further effect in forestalling shocks. The parameters of the situation are the two probabilities of shock associated with the two channels and the rate of advance of the tape programmer.
This random-shock procedure is about as far from the Pavlovian procedure as one can get. There is no escape contingency, hence no "unconditioned response" in the usual sense. There are no external stimuli other than the shock itself, hence no explicit conditioned stimuli. There is no fixed temporal relation between responses and shocks; the tape advances independently of the animal's response and the distribution of intervals in both channels is drawn from random number tables and changed from time to time to prevent any spurious regularity from developing. If avoidance conditioning required a Pavlovian component, this procedure should be minimal or worse. In contrast, if the reduction of shock frequency is the necessary condition for avoidance behavior, this one comes close to being exactly sufficient, omitting as it does irrelevant stimuli of any sort.
There are various lines of evidence leading to the conclusion that the random-shock procedure is fully effective. All but one of the twenty-odd rats tried with the procedure learned to respond. In contrast, both the Sidman procedure and the standard procedure are plagued by a high incidence of nonavoiders. Black (1963) reports between 10% and 50% failures among rats learning an avoidance response in the standard procedure. In the present author's laboratory, with the same experimental chambers, shock generators, levels of shock intensity, and strain of rats, about 25% nonavoiders are expected with Sidman's procedure. The overall shock rates were comparable to what is typically encountered in experiments using Sidman's technique, which is to say in the range from 3 to 10 shocks per minute. In terms of ease of conditioning, then, the present procedure is clearly not less effective than earlier ones, notwithstanding the absence of a clear conditioned stimulus to mediate the Pavlovian component of twofactor theory.
How else might this procedure be compared in effectiveness with the more familiar ones? The published results with this procedure show that as regards both asymptotic rates of responding and resistance to extinction, the random-shock procedure supports at least as much behavior as earlier procedures, given suitable values of the parameters. Rate of responding has been found to be an increasing function of the amount of shock-frequency reduction whereas resistance to extinction, as measured either by time or number of responses to extinction, has been found to be an inverse function of the value of this parameter just prior to extinction.
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Unlike either the standard procedure or the Sidman procedure, the random-shock procedure precludes a fixed relation between any aspect of the situation, temporal or otherwise, and the occurrence of the shock. There is instead only a statistical correlation between responses and shocks; within a given time period, responses are, on the average, inversely related to shocks. The shock rate is reduced immediately after a response and reverts to the original level at the next shock, which takes place at varying 8 Resistance to extinction is therefore inversely related to rate of responding at the start of extinction. It seems that, rather than being measures of response strength, rate of responding and resistance to extinction are here reciprocal measures of the discriminability of the consequences of responding. On the one hand, the smaller the decrement in shock probability caused by a response, the lower the rate of responding, as might reasonably be expected. In the limiting case, with no decrement, the rate of responding goes to zero. On the other hand, a small decrement is likely to make it hard for a rat to detect when the decrement has been shifted to zero, hence the large resistance to extinction.
The persistence of avoidance behavior may generally have more to do with the relative indiscriminability of the shift from training conditions to extinction than with the special processes like "partial irreversibility" (Solomon & Wynne, 1954) that are supposed to characterize aversion. If an animal is avoiding successfully and therefore getting shocked infrequently, the shift to extinction, when the shock is simply withheld, may be expected to make contact with the behavior much more slowly than extinction in the typical paradigm for positive reinforcement. In principle, it should be possible to extinguish avoidance behavior rapidly (as it did under certain conditions here) and positively reinforced behavior slowly by manipulating discriminability.
intervals after the response. The procedure could be characterized equally well by changes in the reciprocal of shock rateshock-free interval. The shock-free interval following a response is, on the average, greater than the shock-free interval measured from any other point in time. The average shock-free interval gradually shrinks back to its original value as time since a response increases.
To save itself, two-factor theory must here find, or invent, a stimulus change at the moment of response and, moreover, the change must have the property of fear reduction, aversion reduction, or the like, based on a history of pairing with shock or its absence. There are sufficient opportunities for invention. The animal's response produces an interval of time that is, on the average, relatively free of shocks. Inferred stimuli associated with this period thus replace the more aversive inferred stimuli otherwise present. Another argument might use proprioceptive, rather than temporal, stimuli. Until the rat presses the lever, the nonavoidance behavior is frequently associated with shock. Following the pressing of the lever, the nonavoidance is less frequently associated with shock. Hence, the pressing of the lever again removes an inferred stimulus made relatively aversive by pairings with shock. In either case, twofactor theory seems to be preserved. There are probably other, at least equally acceptable, versions of two-factor theory for the present findings, a clue, perhaps, to the empirical vacancy of an irrefutable theory.
The reason for dwelling on the hypostatizations of two-factor theory is that a pattern emerges. Two-factor theory says, in effect, that an avoidance procedure must contain a potential difference in shock frequencies which is under the control of the animal's behavior and which is signaled by an initially neutral stimulus. In traditional avoidance procedures, the different shock frequencies are indeed sorted out with respect to stimuli, but the random-shock procedure shows that the change in shock frequency is enough by itself to maintain avoidance. The addition of stimuli to parallel the potential difference is, in the light of the random-shock procedure, gratuitous, even though the habit of searching for one may be too ingrained to be immediately abandoned.
With the random-shock procedure, the inferred stimulus is sheer tautology. Observe the argument in terms of conditioned temporal stimuli. The avoidance response, according to theory, must produce a "stimulus" that signals, on the average, an interval of shock-free time greater than the average shock-free interval correlated with the "stimulus" otherwise prevailing. These "stimuli" have no properties other than the very time intervals or shock rates they presumably signal. Unlike the CS of standard avoidance or the temporal regularity of Sidman's procedure, the stimulus for two-factor theory here has but one attribute and that is its statistical relation to shock frequency. To detect these "stimuli," the animal must be reacting to shock frequencies in the first place. Neither the animal, nor our understanding of avoidance, seems to gain by these inferred stimuli. Mowrer (see p. 57} said that the avoidance of noxious stimulation in an avoidance procedure is a byproduct. The real phenomenon, he said, is escape from a fearsome stimulus. The random-shock procedure shows that in at .least one instance the avoidance of noxious stimulation is itself effective and need not be mediated by any further stimulation.
The one-factor form of avoidance theory just intimated,is but the law of effect itself: A response producing a particular state of affairs is increased in frequency, the state of affairs being here the reduction in shock rate. Mowrer's first (1939) theory of avoidance, it should be remembered, was just such a one-factor theory, as was Miller and Bollard's (1941, p. 50-51) . Two-factor theory was an augmentation beyond the law of effect that was supposed to explain how the conditioned stimulus acquired its control over the animal's behavior. Judging from the literature of the period, there was no thought of an avoidance procedure that contained no conditioned stimulus and therefore required no elaboration beyond the law of effect, although the logic of experimentation clearly suggests a try at one. Nor was two-factor theory a notably parsimonious solution, for it substituted unobserved conditioned "emotional" responses-fear, anxiety, and the like-for the problem of the conditioned stimulus.
An experimental alternative to the random-shock procedure is to try to exclude physiologically the postulated "emotional" responses elicited by the conditioned stimulus, as Taub and Berman (1963, in press) have recently done. In one study (1963) , they showed that forelimb flexion in monkeys in a trace-conditioning avoidance procedure persisted even after deafferentation of the limb. A trace-conditioning procedure, which eliminated any exteroception at the time of the instrumental avoidance response, made proprioception the crucial dimension of the CS, hence the importance of deafferentation. The monkeys were not permitted to see their forelimb. The fact that the monkeys showed only a temporary disruption as a result of deafferentation was interpreted by Taub and Berman as showing that "stimulus termination theories of avoidance conditioning overemphasize the importance of secondary negative reinforcement [p. 1016] ."
The second study cited (Taub & Berman, in press ) was a much more extensive assault on two-factor theories. The original finding was reproduced and extended. They showed that monkeys could be taught the avoidance response for the first time after deafferentation. Next, with a group of trained monkeys, Taub and Berman inflicted complete spinal deafferentation, and the avoidance response remained intact. Finally, a single trained monkey, whose deafferentation was subsequently verified htstologically, was submitted to further sensory impoverishment. Its cranial parasympathetic system was suppressed with atropine and the vagus nerve was sectioned on one side and blocked with procaine on the other. The monkey had a strong tendency to slip into sleep. However, the experimenters found that when the monkey happened to be awake, or when it was kept awake by sharp irrelevant stimulation (loud noise, pinching of the face), it executed the avoidance response as before. The authors' own interpretation of the finding is unequivocal: it will be recognized that under the final conditions avoidance responding proceeded in a situation in which secondary negative reinforcement could not be presented over either proprioceptive, interoceptive [i.e., sympathetic or parasympathetic], or exteroceptive pathways. . . . Proprioception had been, of course, eliminated by total spinal deafferentation, interoception by combined surgical and pharmacological means, and relevant exteroception by preventing the animal from viewing its limbs and through the use of a trace conditioning procedure in which the CS could not be response terminated. These results thus call into doubt stimulus termination theories of avoidance conditioning or, alternately, those theories which attribute the acquisition and maintenance of avoidance behavior to the termination of secondary negative stimuli that are, depending on the theory, either proprioceptive (Schoenfeld, 19SO) , interoceptive (Mowrer, 1947) , or exteroceptive in nature [Taub & Berman, in press],
THE CS AS S D
It has been shown that CS termination is either an unnecessary or an untestable feature of avoidance procedures. Avoidance has been shown where CS termination has been minimized or eliminated as a factorexperimentally (Herrnstein & Hineline, 1966) , physiologically (Taub & Berman, in press) , and statistically (Bolles, Stokes, & Younger, 1966) . However, to show that the Pavlovian component of two-factor theory is not necessary is not to prove that it is insignificant in procedures in which a CS is unquestionably present.
There still remains, in other words, the question whether the transferring of some unobserved drive state ("aversion" or "anxiety") to the conditioned stimulus is a fact that must be taken into account in procedures that involve such stimuli.
At least a few theorists have expressed dubiety. In Sidman's procedure, for example, the use of a warning signal just before the shock causes the responses to occur during this period rather than at other times (Sidman & Boren, 1957) . As Keehn (1959) has noted, the warning signal should be fearsome, according to two-factor theory, and in Sidman's procedure it can be avoided by a response that occurs prior to its onset. Instead, the rats wait until it is turned on and then terminate it. How, wonders Keehn, can this be if the Pavlovian mechanism is working as it should? Similarly, D 'Amato, Fazzaro, and Etkin (1968) present results suggesting that the role of CS termination may be more a matter of feedback for the response than of anxiety reduction. They showed normal acquisition of avoidance for rats whose responses produced a distinctive feedback stimulus instead of CS termination.
Avoidance conditioning as involving stimulus discrimination is not wholly a new idea even among two-factor theorists. Mowrer and Lamoreaux (1951) noted that in the standard avoidance procedure, responding often occurs nonselectively at first, during both the CS and the intertrial interval. With additional training, response frequencies during the two periods separate, sometimes approaching the reflexlike elicitation of the CR by the CS and the CS alone. However, they snowed that if the CS is only marginally discriminable, animals may never come under the precise control of the CS, resulting in avoidance that tends to occur more or less without regard to the presence of the CS. The authors point out that avoidance usually involves stimulus discrimination, but that the avoidance response may sometimes be in evidence sooner than any sign of stimulus discrimination. At this point, however, the train of discussion gets derailed, with Mowrer (1960, p. 448-449) explaining that the animals must become quickly conditioned to fear the situation as a whole and that the Pavlovian component of two-factor theory is therefore present anyway. Mowrer seems to have overlooked the other requirement of his own two-factor theory, the removal of the CS. If the situation-as-a-whole is functioning as the CS, then how does the avoidance response get reinforced? It seems a logical requirement of the two-factor theory that a stimulus be discriminated out of the complex impinging on the animal, a stimulus whose removal is what reinforces the avoidance response. The nonselectivity of the avoidance behavior in his own study is actually far more damaging to two-factor theory than has apparently been recognized. And conversely, when avoidance responding is selective, the CS is invariably functioning as at least a cue.
What is at question is not whether the CS exerts an effect over responding, for that is indubitable. It is, rather, whether CS termination comprises the reinforcer in the sense meant by two-factor theory, or whether the CS is fundamentally just a discriminative stimulus (S D ), or cue, for reinforced responding, as Keehn (1959) concluded from his consideration of the signaled form of Sidman's procedure. To conclude that the CS is nothing more than an S D is to conclude that CS termination is insufficient (besides being unnecessary), since an S D is a stimulus that merely sets the occasion for a reinforcer, which in the case of avoidance is presumably the reduction of the frequency of the aversive event, rather than being itself reinforcing.
Wherever it appears in an avoidance procedure, the CS sets the occasion for the avoidance response. In the presence of the CS, the avoidance response reduces the amount of aversive stimulation; in its absence, the contingency is absent. At least descriptively, the CS in avoidance procedures is functionally similar to the S D in simple positive reinforcement procedures. In each case, the stimuli divide the experimental session into two interwoven subsessions, defined by different consequences for responding.
The present argument is that even in standard avoidance, in which there is ample occasion for Pavlovian conditioning, the cue function of the stimulus is alone relevant to avoidance. To support this argument it would be necessary to show that whether or not there is a CS, all of the results concerning the avoidance response follow from the instrumental contingencies. This is not to say that there is no Pavlovian conditioning going on during such avoidance experiments, but rather that the classically conditioned responses are not a requirement for the instrumental behavior. We do not attribute the S D function of a positive discriminative stimulus to Pavlovian conditioning although it is not unlikely that the pairing of an arbitrary stimulus with food may have Pavlovian consequences. For example, the S D for food-reinforced lever pressing may also cause the rat to salivate, but conceptually the one result is in no way dependent upon RESPONSE _n_n_ FIG. 5. Diagrams of two hypothetical avoidance procedures. (A. Standard avoidance, but with an inescapable, fixed-duration shock. The avoidance response terminates the conditioned stimulus and avoids the shock. The break indicates a period of practice, presumably bringing the performance to its final level, B, An avoidance procedure in which a train of fixed-duration, inescapable shocks may be interrupted by the avoidance response, but only while the stimulus is present. At other times, the shock is unavoidable as well as inescapable. The break again indicates a period of practice, presumably bringing the performance to its final level.) the other. And empirically as well, the literature (Rescorla & Solomon, 1967, p. 164-170) does not indicate that Pavlovian conditioning is a prerequisite for instrumental conditioning, nor, for that matter, vice versa.
It is true that most avoidance procedures are not precisely comparable to the usual discriminated operant, for the CS is terminated by the response it controls whereas the S D usually is not. The difference may, however, be owing to nothing more profound than historical accident and may be of no theoretical significance. ' Figure 5 shows two avoidance procedures; one is essentially the standard paradigm (A) and the other (B) is a hypothetical arrangement that would mimic a positively reinforced, discriminated operant. Paradigm A comprises signaled avoidance without an escape contingency and may be expected to lead to responding as shown to the right of the break. The avoidance response occurs when the CS is presented and rarely at other times. Paradigm B comprises a train of shocks and the periodic presentation of a stimulus (S D ) in whose presence the response stops the shock for the remainder of its presentation. Paradigm B also has no escape contingency, which is to say that each shock is of fixed duration. The responding may be expected to be as shown to the right of the break, with a response soon after the onset of S D and rarely at other times. Since B is just the random-shock procedure under stimulus control and with periodic, instead of random, presentations of shock, it seems a good hunch that responding would be maintained as indicated.
The probable outcome of Paradigm B raises a problem for two-factor theory, although it is obviously in keeping with the idea of the CS as a cue. The S D is neither terminated by the response, unlike a proper CS, nor, for that matter, should it elicit fear any more than its absence does. In fact, once the avoidance response begins to occur, the animal should be, if anything, less afraid in the presence of the S D than in its absence.
However, two-factor theory's problem seems to be, as so often, overcome by a suitable rearrangement of definitions. The CS is, the theory would have to say, not the S D at all, but a stimulus complex comprising the S D and the proprioception of not having responded. The occurrence of the avoidance response changes this into another stimulus complex-S D -plus-the-proprioception-of-having-responded-which constitutes a relatively safe period and thus does not elicit responding. The absence of the S D also does not elicit responding, but here because responding is ineffective in altering the schedule of shock presentation. As with the random-shock procedure, two-factor theory must again endow stimuli with properties based on shock frequency and then use these properties to explain the animal's sensitivity to shock frequency. In contrast, the idea that the CS is an S D is readily consistent with the responding in either paradigm.
The presumed outcome of a hypothetical experiment is hardly enough, however, to dislodge a widely held theory. It remains to be shown that in real experiments as well, the CS is not essentially different from an S D , which is to say that the contingencies of instrumental reinforcement alone make sense out of the behavior. Would the termination of the CS support avoidance behavior if there were no actual avoidance of the aversive event? In the usual avoidance procedure, the two possible sources of re-inforcement are confounded: CS termination and unconditioned stimulus (US) avoidance are in a one-to-one relation. Twofactor theory has said that the latter is a "by-product" of the former. The present discussion turns this around and asks whether the former has any potency independent of the latter. Kamin (1956 Kamin ( , 1957 obtained responding in the Miller-Mowrer apparatus with rats which either terminated the CS without avoiding the US or avoided the US without terminating the CS, although neither group was the equal of the rats which did both. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that CS termination has thereby been shown to be an independent source of response strength. Kamin's experiments used the "standard" avoidance procedure, which means that the rats had to escape from the shock if they failed to avoid it. For the crucial CS-terminating group, there was no shock avoidance, only CS termination, and then, a few seconds later, the shock was presented anyway, and the rats duly escaped. It seems questionable to call this CS-terminating response an "avoidance" response when it could so easily have been a generalized escape response. Moreover, the data indicate a fall-off in the response towards the end of the 100 trials of the study (Kamin, 1957, Figure 1 ), just as might be expected of a generalized response. The recent study by Bolles, Stokes, and Younger (1966) substantiates this suggestion and also indicates that CS termination has little if any intrinsic reinforcing effect. These investigators showed that the elimination of the shock-escape contingency significantly reduced the number of responses by the CS termination group. In fact, they found no consistent differences between rats that were just terminating the CS without either avoiding or escaping and rats that were neither terminating the CS nor avoiding or escaping. CS termination facilitated responding only for rats that were also avoiding, escaping, or both, a finding that is plausibly considered a response-feedback effect, as Bolles et al. suggest and as D'Amato et al. (1968) have further substantiated with their work.
The lines of defense for two-factor theory had been laid out in Kamin's (1956 Kamin's ( , 1957 original papers on US avoidance and CS termination and will doubtless be held against the sally from Bolles et al. (1966) . The responding apparently due to US termination, said Kamin (and Mowrer, 1960, p. 53) , may actually result from the termination of the CS at the end of the CS-US interval and not from the omission of the US at that moment. Moreover, the weakness (or absence) of responding that terminates the CS without avoiding the US, Kamin suggested, is the result of a punishment effect, for the shock is presented on all trials, regardless of the occurrence of a CS-terminating response. Just as it proved to be peculiarly hard to omit the CS, so it proves to be peculiarly hard to isolate CS termination from the other elements that may affect responding, and for the same reason. Two-factor theorists have allowed themselves to interpret avoidance procedures post hoc, designating as the effective CS whatever would tend to substantiate the theory. If CS termination fails to support responding, it is because a punishment effect has intervened. If responding is supported in the absence of an ostensible contingency for CS termination, it is because the absence is only ostensiblethe contingency is said to be there anyway, but delayed.
In this context, two unpublished studies by Hineline are instructive, for they concentrate on the effects of CS termination in a novel way, one that would demand a wholly new reinterpretation for two-factor theory, at any rate. Both procedures used rats in a leverpressing apparatus in which the lever could be withdrawn and reinserted remotely. In one procedure (see Figure 6 ), lever pressing had no effect on the overall frequency of shock. An experimental session comprised 300 cycles, each lasting 20 seconds. The rat was shocked 8 seconds after the start of a cycle if no response occurred first. Then, 2 seconds later, the lever was automatically retracted for 10 seconds, concluding the 20-second cycle. (The presence and absence of the lever were correlated with an auditory signal, balanced as to presence and absence across animals.) A depression of SHOCK 20 SECONDS FIG. 6 . A procedure in which the response retracts the lever for the remainder of a fixed 20-second cycle and also postpones, but does not avoid, the shock. (The shock occurs while the lever is absent or present, depending, respectively, upon whether or not a response has occurred in that cycle. There is always one shock in every cycle, and every cycle lasts exactly 20 seconds. The shaded portions show when the lever is withdrawn.) the lever during the first 8 seconds retracted the lever immediately, but the shock was not omitted, only postponed. Instead of getting shocked at the usual time, the rat was shocked at the 18th second of any cycle in which it had responded. Once retracted, the lever was never returned until the start of the next cycle. This arrangement kept the cycle fixed at 20 seconds, and the number of shocks per session equal to the number of cycles. Two-factor theory seems to predict that the responding be initially acquired, since it serves to remove stimuli associated with shock. However, once the response is occurring frequently, the shock is being correlated with the absence of the original CS, resulting in drive induction, rather than reduction, for the response, which might then be expected to diminish in frequency, which, in turn, would restore the conditions for its initial acquisition, and so on. Just how this oscillating state of affairs would finally affect performance is not spelled out by the theory.
In contrast to this complexity, the results of the study were strikingly clear. Every rat tested, including both experimentally naive and previously trained rats, showed consistent, high levels of responding. In sessions consisting of 300 trials, rats typically responded on more than 260 occasions. The behavior seemed stable and showed no diminution in several months of daily sessions.
The results of the second procedure examined by Hineline (see Figure 7) were in clear contrast. Again, there was a 20-second cycle, with 10 seconds each for the presence and absence of the lever. And as before, a shock was scheduled for the 8th second of a cycle in the absence of responding and for 2 seconds before the end of a cycle if there had been a response. The sole difference was in how long the lever was withdrawn after a response retracted it. In this second procedure, the lever was always absent for exactly 10 seconds, no matter when it was withdrawn. In this way, the occurrence of a response shortened the cycle without eliminating the shock. Unlike the preceding procedure, responses actually increased the frequency of shock during a session of given duration, instead of leaving it unchanged. Each response subtracted a period of shock-free time whose duration depended on the locus of response within the cycle-the earlier the response, the greater the increase in shock rate. Two-factor theory seems to go through about the same steps as before. The response might be acquired because it removes a stimulus associated with shock, but might then diminish in frequency since it precludes the pairing of the CS with the aversive event, which, in turn, restores the original conditions, and so on. In fact, it is hard to find in two-factor theory a precedent for FIG. 7 . A procedure in which the response retracts the lever for 10 seconds. (In the absence of responding, the cycle lasts 20 seconds, but responses shorten the cycle in inverse relation to their latency. The shock occurs while the lever is absent or present, depending, respectively, upon whether or not a response has occurred in that cycle. There is always one shock in every cycle, and cycles last 20 seconds or less. The shaded portions show when the lever is withdrawn.) supposing any important difference between the two procedures. In both, the nominal CS is terminated by a response. In both, the non-CS gets paired with the shock to the extent that the response occurs. In both, lever-pressing has the maximum delay-ofshock associated with it, compared to any other behavior in the situation.
With the second procedure, however, no rat acquired lever pressing. Rats initially trained to avoid on other procedures, including Hineline's first procedure, soon stopped responding.
The difference between the two procedures proved to be crucial-one fully adequate, the other totally inadequate.
For both procedures two-factor theory predicts a fluctuation in responding, since pairings between the shock and some stimulus go on no matter what the animal does, but which stimulus is paired depends on the animal's behavior. If it responds, the pairings are between the previously safe stimulus and the shock; if it does not respond, the pairings are between the nominal CS and the shock. Hull (1929) noted a similar problem in standard avoidance. If the response is dependent on the shock, then successful avoidance should mean a weakened response, since it prevents the shock's occurring. Later theorists have also wondered how a response can be steadily maintained when its motivating circumstance is removed by its occurrence. The contemporary answers, within the context of two-factor theory, are the notions of "anxiety conservation" and "partial irreversibility" (Solomon & Wynne, 1954) . It is worth recalling this answer to see that it is not applicable to the present findings. The problem here is not the preservation of the motivating effects of the CS after the animal's avoidance responding has effectively terminated the pairings that produced the effects in the first place. Rather, it is that the pairings go on unchecked in the present instance, either with the nominal CS or with its absence, depending respectively on the absence of the response or its occurrence. Neither anxiety conservation nor partial irreversibility helps to explain the steady responding here for one procedure and its steady absence for the other, since it is not the omission of shock that creates a problem, but its presence.
Two-factor theory fails to define the issues here, let alone account for the results. In contrast, the idea of shock-frequency reduction under the control of discriminative stimuli defines the issue exactly and perhaps handles the outcome. Both procedures employ a pair of discriminative stimuli, each correlated with the occurrence of shock according to some routine, much as in a multiple schedule (Ferster & Skinner, 1957) . In Hineline's first procedure, the shock is correlated with one discriminative stimulus, (S D i)-the nominal CS-such that whenever shock is presented in its presence, the shock rate is necessarily one shock per 10 seconds.
(This disregards the rare instances when responses occurred in the 2 seconds following shock and prior to the withdrawal of the lever. Including those instances would only further support the present view.) On the other hand, the shock is correlated with the other discriminative stimulus (S D 2 )-the nominal "safe" stimulussuch that when the shock is given here it is always during some period greater than 10 seconds, since its duration is set at 10 seconds plus the remaining duration of the first half of the cycle. To the rat, then, each cycle presents a choice between a pair of stimuli in whose presence the potential shock rates are different. If the rat "calculates" shock rates per stimulus period, rather than for the experimental session as a whole, then the response is reinforced by the reduction in shock rate associated with a. response-produced change from S D j to S D 2. The failure to maintain behavior in Hineline's second study further suggests that the rat is sensitive to shock rates per stimulus condition. Here, it should be recalled, the shock always occurs in a 10-second period, whether in S D i or S D 2 . The response, then, produces no change in shock rates when calculated with respect to stimulus periods. Hence, responding here is extinguished or simply not acquired.
The difference between the two procedures may, then, be seen as a difference in the shock rates associated with the two discriminative stimuli in the situation.
The response occurs when it is reinforced by a change from a higher to a lower shock rate, as these are correlated with the discriminative stimuli, and not when it causes no such change. For present purposes, however, the main import of Hineline's findings is not to suggest the form of a new theory, but to show that CS termination is by itself insufficient to produce avoidance responding.
EMOTION, KNOWLEDGE, AND AVOIDANCE In fairness to those who have supported two-factor theory, it must be said that more than just the ordinary avoidance results are involved. In particular, various experiments showed that animals learn to terminate a stimulus previously paired with shock, even when the learning does not involve any direct correlation between the response and the shock.
For example, May (1948) trained rats to escape from a shock, and then, when no escape was possible, exposed them to pairings of a buzzer and the shock. These rats escaped from the buzzer alone when given the opportunity. Miller (1948) further showed that rats can be taught a new response to escape from the CS. He first had rats escaping from shock in one compartment to another compartment without shock. Next, the rats were taught to turn a wheel or press a bar to get out of the compartment without any shock to goad them. Finally, Brown and Jacobs (1949) showed, perhaps most dramatically, that rats would learn to escape from a CS alone after having experienced only pairings of the stimulus with the shock and no prior escape training.
These findings, and others like them, leave no doubt that it is possible for a stimulus to gain control over a response without having been directly involved in a correlation between the response and a reinforcer, a phenomenon that has been broadly extended recently (Rescorla & Solomon, 1967) . And it is not only with negative reinforcers that this possibility has been demonstrated. For example, Estes (1948) and Morse and Skinner (1958) have shown that if animals (rats or pigeons, respectively) first experience pairings of a stimulus with food and then are taught a response to gain food (but not the stimulus), then the stimulus alone will by its mere presence facilitate responding, without regard to food. In a similar vein are the phenomena of sensory preconditioning, in which stimuli also gain control over responses in the absence of a direct contingency between them.
Given a sufficiently broad frame of reference, the problem of the CS in avoidance conditioning merges into the more general problem of what it is that "transfers" or gets "associated" when any stimuli are paired. The classical answer--"ideas"-has long since gone out of fashion and is probably not due for revival, nor is it being advocated here. The Pavlovian answer is that a response transfers. As stated at the beginning of this paper, the observable response was seen by some as the objective handle to the philosophers' associationism. It was in this spirit that Hull originally (1929) wrote about avoidance as a transferring of some response from a noxious stimulus to one anticipating it. The evolution of method and theory has, however, undermined such a Dimple objectivistic account of avoidance. First the response and then the conditioned stimulus were driven back into the organism, just about where the philosophers had had them in the first place. Is there, at this point, any scientific advantage to the Pavlovian vocabulary? It seems no less objective to infer an "expectation" or an "anticipation" as to infer a drive, except for theoretical proclivities toward one sort of concept or the other. Several theorists, in fact, were willing to risk their status among the tough-minded (Hilgard & Marquis, 1940; Osgood, 1950; Ritchie, 1951) and opt for a cognitive approach.
However, the data themselves, as Miller (1948) pointed out, do not favor one view over the other :
It seems possible that the potentialities of responseproduced stimuli as mediators of secondary generalization and sources of acquirable drive may account in stimulus-response, law-of-effect terms for the type of behavior which has been described as "expectancy" and considered to be an exception to this type of explanation. If it should turn out that all of the phenomena of expectancy can be explained on the basis of the drive and cue functions of response-produced stimuli, expectancy will of course not vanish; it will be established as a secondary principle derivable from more primary ones [p. 99] .
Cognitive theories are, according to Miller, not so much wrong as profligate, at least in comparison to the parsimonious doctrine he was advancing. According to Solomon and Brush (1956) the trouble with cognitive theories is simply that they are not motivational theories:
Anxiety for Tolman is not a drive state but a negative expectation, a knowledge of bad things to come. This type of theory was weak only because it did not have any provision for predicting the development of a specific instrumental avoidance response. Almost any skeletal locomotor response was accepted by Tolman as an index of negative expectations, as S's knowledge of what is to come. To a marked degree, early cognitive theory left the S knowing what was going to happen, but it did not provide him with a mechanism for doing anything useful about it. Nor did it emphasize the motivating properties of emotional conditioning. It was pretty dispassionate; too much so for such a dreadful process as avoidance trainings [pp. 236-237] ! Solomon and Brush were dissatisfied with the CS as a cue because they assumed that cues do not motivate. However, cues in stimulus discrimination procedures routinely produce behavior presumably without possessing drive status, but this is rarely noted in discussions of avoidance.
The argument between the behaviorists and the cognitivists reduces to a choice between imputing emotion or knowledge to the animal at the time of the CS, although the theorists have shied away from such a stark characterization of their dispute. Implicit in the argument has been the idea that the CS is necessary for the occurrence of the response-hence the effects of the CS have been of central concern. However useful the argument has been as a stimulant to experimentation, it probably delayed the discovery that CS termination is neither necessary nor sufficient and that the reduction of aversive stimulation is probably both.
The alternatives-emotion or knowledge -arise in theory, not observation. As far as observation is concerned, the study of avoidance has shown that various configurations of stimuli, responses, and negative reinforcers produce effects that can be summarized in a reasonably small number of paradigmatic findings, which this paper has attempted to survey. In some cases, it may seem reasonable to suppose that the rat is indeed afraid of the CS, but only under the assumption that a rat's or a guinea pig's subjective life is enough like man's to permit a common vocabulary. In other cases, the animal does not seem to be afraid of the CS, as in the signaled version of Sidman's procedure or in Lockard's (1963) demonstration that rats prefer signaled to unsignaled shock. In any event, there is nothing to suggest that the subjective state explains the behavior, any more than vice versa. And there is a good deal in psychology's past to discourage such interactionistic speculations.
The theme of the present paper is that the reinforcement for avoidance behavior is a reduction in time of aversive stimulation, the very idea that both Mowrer and Schoenfeld explicitly rejected. At the heart of the argument is the notion that an animal can respond to the rate of occurrence of events in its environment. Fortunately, it is a notion that has support from various sources in the analysis of behavior (Anger, 1956; Herrnstein, 1961 Herrnstein, , 1964 Reynolds, 1963) . The primary complication of this simple picture arises in the effects of cues. Our understanding of cues is far from complete, but it seems better to let the results of further inquiry shape the concept than to preserve a theory that has passed over the line into irrefutable doctrine.
